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This essay argues that the Penn Central merger was an ill-conceived idea that was 
doomed by larger economic factors, poor management, and outdated practices and regulations. 
Penn Central’s failure forced the government to step in to preserve the vital pieces of 
infrastructure contained within Penn Central. The government decided that nationalization, in the 
form of Conrail, was the best route to take because Penn Central could not be reorganized under 
bankruptcy protection. Conrail’s management, helped by railroad deregulation in the form of the 
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act and the Staggers Act, led the company to 
profitability and enabled its privatization.  It ultimately helped to preserve railroads in the 
northeast United States. The story of Penn Central and Conrail serves as a case study in the 
process of American industrial decline, the transition from New Deal Keynesianism to Reaganite 






On January 31st, 1968, the last train the Pennsylvania Railroad would ever run, the 11:59 
Paoli Local, trundled out of Philadelphia’s Suburban Station on Track 2. Across the platform on 
Track 1, was a private rail car, painted with the word “Central” on its side. At 12:04 A.M., 
February 1st, John McMurrough, a PRR foreman, ceremonially peeled off a piece of black tape 
to the left of “Central”, revealing the word “Penn”. The side of the railcar now read “Penn 
Central” and 11 years of work merging the two railroads was complete. Inauspiciously, the event 
occurred three minutes behind schedule.1 
Introduction 
In the 1960s, the New York Central (NYC) and Pennsylvania (PRR) Railroads faced 
mounting challenges. These two railroads experienced declining profitability as a result of 
competition with the rising trucking and airline industries, both subsidized by government 
construction of the Interstate Highway System and of airports, respectively. The NYC and PRR 
were based in the dense Northeastern United States (see Figure 1), resulting in large amounts of 
their business coming from increasingly unpopular short haul freights, commuter trains and 
longer distance passenger trains. Unfortunately for the railroads, the powerful Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC) fixed their freight and passenger rates.  Confronted with declining 
business, both the NYC and PRR, bitter rivals for over 100 years, decided that their best chance 
for continued survival was to merge in order to attempt to cut costs and create a stable, profitable 
company. After years of attempting to gain the approval of antitrust regulators in Washington, 
 
1 Daughen. The Wreck of the Penn Central. 3-5.  
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the two companies merged to form the Penn Central (PC) in 1968. Additionally, the ICC 
mandated that the new Penn Central absorb the already bankrupt New York, New Haven & 
Hartford Railroad (NH) in order to assist the railroad industry in New England, which was 
already greatly struggling.  Combined, these three railroads formed the first mega-railroad, 
carrying around 20 percent of the nation’s rail traffic.  
The merger was a total disaster.  The NYC and PRR failed to integrate at all levels, from 
the boardroom in Philadelphia all the way down to the brakemen in the cabooses. Penn Central 
never turned a profit, and in 1970 it became the largest bankruptcy in American history. At that 
point, the government realized that it had to step in to bail out Penn Central. In 1971, the 
government formed Amtrak to take over all long distance passenger services in the country, 
helping the beleaguered Penn Central. However, it became obvious that the line, in its present 
form, could not be saved. Something radical had to be done to preserve the railroad industry in 
the Northeast and Great Lakes, which despite its financial woes, was economically vital to the 
region and country as a whole. The solution was the creation of Conrail, a government 
corporation that would take over the assets of the Penn Central and other bankrupt railroads and 
attempt to turn them into a profitable operation. This was rather novel and stands as one of the 
first big industrial bailouts that paved the way for similar moves to be taken with General Motors 
and Chrysler during the Great Recession following the 2008 financial crash.  
Conrail was, by all measures, a great success. Following railroad deregulation in 1980, it 
turned a consistent profit and became regarded as an efficient and effective company. After years 
of profitability and paying down a large amount of Penn Central’s massive debt, the federal 
government privatized Conrail.  It continued as an independent company until bought by CSX 
and Norfolk Southern in 1999. Penn Central’s failures were a product of a changing economy, 
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archaic industry practices, and outdated regulations for the railroad industry. Both the 
nationalization of Penn Central, resulting in the formation of Conrail, and regulatory overhaul, 
primarily via the Staggers Act of 1980, were necessary to save the rail industry both in the 
Northeast and nationwide.    
The story of Penn Central and Conrail serves as a case study in the process of American 
industrial decline, the transition from Keynesian to neoliberal macroeconomic management, and 
the changed relationship between government and business that accompanied it. The fall of Penn 
Central serves as an example and harbinger for the relative decline of American heavy industry, 
beginning in the 1960s in New England and the northeast and spreading across the country. That 
Penn Central, the nation’s sixth largest company, could fail was symbolic of the troubled times 
for the American economy in the 1970s. Its rescue through the formation of Conrail, a railroad 
owned by the U.S. government, was one of the last gasps of New Deal government activism. The 
railroads had been nationalized during World War I, but that was a temporary maneuver in a 
time of national security crisis. The formation of Conrail seemed much more permanent, 
considering that Penn Central was horribly unprofitable.  
Existing scholarship on this drama focuses largely on the failure of Penn Central and who 
was at fault. For example, Stephen Salsbury, in No Way to Run a Railroad, attempts to exonerate 
Pennsylvania railroad leader, David Bevan. Other authors are less kind. The ideological battle 
over what to do with the bankrupt Penn Central receives less attention. Some authors, like 
Richard Saunders, touch on it, but as a larger piece of the national railroad picture at the time. 
Conrail was revolutionary and intrinsically tied to politics and ideology, as well as business. 
Would the government embrace free market orthodoxy and let Penn Central be liquidated? Or 
would it step in and rescue the railroads? Would all railroads eventually be nationalized? Or was 
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there another way out? These were the idealogical questions faced by the U.S. Government in 
the 1970s. 
The ultimate fate of Conrail, and the railroad industry as a whole, was tied to the 
emergence of a deregulatory approach to federal economic policy. In 1979, the Jimmy Carter 
Administration deregulated the airlines, radically reshaping the air transport business. The 
Staggers Act of 1980  allowed railroads to set their own rates and greatly reduced the power of 
the ICC over the railroads. As with so many neoliberal policies, the Staggers Act was great for 
business.  Conrail returned to profitability and was eventually privatized.2 However, there were 
losers, namely Conrail’s employees. Conrail largely became profitable by shrinking its payroll 
and abandoning underutilized track.3 The Penn Central - Conrail saga serves as a case study for 
the transition to neoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s. The government stepped in to take over a 
struggling business, but rather than continuing to nationalize railroads as they failed, it 
deregulated the industry, allowing a return to profitability and eventual privatization. Business 
won, the workers lost, and governments ended up unloading the now profitable freight business 
and retaining the unprofitable passenger business through Amtrak and various state level 
commuter rail operations like MARC, SEPTA, NJ Transit, Metro-North, the LIRR and others. 
Profits were privatized, and losses were socialized.  
 
2 This was in line with the neoliberal maxim that government should not be involved in industry, for example, look 
no further than the Thatcher and Major governments in Britain privatizing coal, steel and of course, British Rail. 
 
3 Salpukas, Agis. "A Turnaround for Conrail: Cost Cutting Helps Carrier Run in Black." New York Times (1923-





The Penn Central Merger 
On January 31, 1968, after years of negotiations and legal proceedings, a federal court in 
New York allowed the largest corporate merger in American history up to that point to go 
through. The merger took effect immediately, with the Pennsylvania and New York Central 
Railroads becoming the Penn Central Railroad at 12:01 A.M. on February 1st.4 However, the 
financial outlook for the newly merged railroad was grim. In 1967, the PRR and NYC combined 
to earn from their railroad operations a total of $71,433,340.  In 1966 they had earned 
$147,289,578. To make matters worse, due to a whopping $275,421,985 in an “extraordinary 
charge for costs and losses incurred upon merger”, the combined Penn Central posted a net loss 
of $203,988,645 for 1967.5 Despite a report dismissing the loss as an anomaly, the Penn Central 
would never turn a net profit in its brief existence.  
The Decline of American Railroading 
The story of the Penn Central symbolizes the decline of railroads in the post-World War 
II era. Freight, the main source of income for both the Pennsylvania and the Central, suffered as 
the trucking industry, aided by the construction of the Interstate Highway System, grew rapidly. 
While this hurt all railroads, it particularly hurt railroads in the Northeast, which transported 
large amounts of mixed bulk freight in boxcars and time sensitive goods, such as mail and 
 
4 Hammer, Alexander R. "Court here Lets Railroads Consolidate Tomorrow: Rail Merger Gets Final Clearance." 
New York Times (1923-Current File), Jan 31, 1968. 
http://proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/118396914?accountid=14663. 
 
5 In 2019 USD, per www.usinflationcalculator.com, the figures listed are, respectively, $548,734,235.84, 
$1,166,365,256.70, $2,115,727,368.67 and $1,566,993,132.82;  




Trucking greatly cut into the bulk freight business. Railroads outside the Northeast 
primarily hauled commodities such as coal, lumber and iron ore, which were not particularly 
economical to haul by truck. To make matters worse, the Interstate Commerce Commission 
tightly controlled shipping rates, leaving railroads unable to raise rates to cover mounting losses. 
On the passenger side of the business, all railroads were in tough shape. Passenger numbers had 
plummeted from their World War II peak, and passenger service operated on much thinner 
margins than freight. As passenger numbers fell, the trains became unprofitable, subsidized only 
by Railway Post Offices. The Pennsylvania and the Central operated more passenger trains than 
anyone else, running not only intercity trains, but a large number of suburban commuter services 
in and out of major cities. Along with the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad (NH), 
commonly referred to as simply the New Haven, the PRR and NYC were among the busiest 
passenger railroads in the country.   
In better times, passenger service was rather lucrative for these railroads. Suburban 
residents not only took commuter trains into the city for their jobs, they also used the trains to 
reach shops, restaurants and entertainment in cities. Before the rise of the automobile, this 
guaranteed a healthy demand at all hours for suburban commuter services.6  As auto-oriented 
suburbanization took off in the 1950s, suburbanites abandoned the trains in favor of driving their 
cars to new suburban shopping centers. Railroads in the Western United States, where cities were 
smaller, were able to cut their losses and discontinue their suburban services. This was not 
possible for the Pennsylvania or New York Central. Cities such as New York and Philadelphia 
 
6 Salsbury, Stephen. No Way to Run a Railroad : The Untold Story of the Penn Central Crisis. New York: McGraw-
Hill. 1982. 31-32. 
 
9 
still had considerable demand for rush hour commuter services. This required the railroads to 
keep large fleets of labor-intensive passenger equipment. With the passenger equipment carrying 
considerable numbers of passengers only in the morning and evening peak, most of it remained 
idle in rail yards during the day. If a train is not carrying anything, it is not making money, a 
business concept known as “unused capacity.”7 Busy suburban trains, once a valuable asset to 
the Pennsylvania and the Central, were now a drain on their limited money and resources.  
To make matters worse, these services, such as the Long Island Rail Road (LIRR), a PRR 
subsidiary, were in a decrepit state, often using rolling stock from the turn of the 20th century 
and hemorrhaging money. The disrepair of their equipment ran up maintenance costs. Since 
these trains were so unreliable, railroads like the LIRR had to keep a high “spare factor” to 
provide service, which increased maintenance costs.8 Service levels steadily declined as 
equipment and track deteriorated. Due to the huge losses suffered by these operations, there was 
no money to fix either track or equipment. Fewer and fewer trains ran, leading to further declines 
in ridership and by extension, money. Yet, commuters were highly dependent on suburban trains. 
In many cases, state governments stepped in to either purchase or heavily subsidize these 
services. New York State, for example, purchased the LIRR for $65 million9 from the 
Pennsylvania Railroad, which was glad to be rid of it.10 
 
7 Ibid. 32-33. 
 
8 Spare factor is a term that describes the amount of spare equipment that is required on any given day to replace 
trains that are cancelled due to mechanical issues. Since unreliable equipment fails more often, more spare 
equipment is needed to cover for the failed equipment, which cannot be used in revenue service. 
 
9 $529,432,222.22 in 2019 USD per https://www.usinflationcalculator.com. 
 
10 Perlmutter, Emanuel. "State in Accord with the Pennsy on Buying L.I.R.R.” P.R.R. Agrees on Price of $65 





Railroads possessed an ossified management structure ill-equipped to handle the 
operational challenges they faced. The Pennsylvania, like most other railroads, promoted its 
president and top brass from within the company. These men generally came from operations 
and had little knowledge or experience in business management techniques. They could make the 
trains run on time, but they could not effectively delegate and run the enormous bureaucracy 
required to make a corporation like the Pennsylvania Railroad function. Perhaps the archetypical 
railroad leader was the Pennsylvania’s Martin W. Clement, who served as president from 1935 to 
1949 and chairman of the board from 1949 to 1951. Clement commanded respect and fear from 
his subordinates, but he was an old school autocrat with a disdain for the railroad’s financial 
department and little interest in adopting a more modern financial or management strategy.11 
When Clement retired after 51 years of working for the Pennsylvania, there was potential for 
change. 
The top job at the Pennsylvania fell to Walter S. Franklin until 1954, when James M. 
Symes, his handpicked successor took the reins. Both men, while traditional railroaders to their 
core, were more receptive towards modern business and financial practices such as the use of 
computers and modernized accounting. In May 1951, Franklin hired a new vice president for 
finance, David C. Bevan, who was the first of the three leading characters in Penn Central’s 
collapse.  Although his father worked for the Pennsylvania, and he grew up along suburban 
Philadelphia’s Main Line, Bevan was an outsider, a professionally educated financial analyst 
with experience in banking and insurance, not railroading. He was drawn to the financial 
 
11 Salsbury. No Way to Run a Railroad. 34-36. 
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challenge of reforming Pennsylvania’s finances. Thus, David Bevan became a railroad man like 
his father.12 
Bevan quickly discovered that the Pennsylvania was burdened with massive debt, a lack 
of liquidity, razor thin profit margins, and ineffective and ancient management practices largely 
unchanged since the turn of the 20th century. Impressively, he quickly began to right the ship. 
When the autocratic Clement retired at the end of 1951, Bevan secured more autonomy and 
power for himself as vice president for finance and set about paying down and restructuring the 
Pennsylvania’s debt, which by1963 Bevan had succeeded in reducing by 30 percent.13 
Additionally, Bevan began to drag the Pennsylvania’s management practices and accounting into 
the 20th century. Bevan’s first 12 years at the Pennsylvania generated significant and successful 
changes for the company. It had less debt, a modern computer system to track freight cars, a 
totally overhauled accounting system, and an improved management structure. However, big 
changes were on the horizon -- changes beyond Bevan’s control. 
The First Merger Talks & the Rise of Perlman 
As the economy entered recession in 1957,  the earnings of both the Central and the 
Pennsylvania plummeted.14 In response, a concerned James Symes, PRR president, began 
merger talks with Robert R. Young, the Central’s Chairman of the Board, and Alfred E. Perlman, 
its president and the second of the three main figures in the Penn Central disaster.  In November, 
the two railroads announced that they were studying a merger. In a shocking turn of events, 
 
12 Ibid. 44. 
 
13 Pennsylvania Railroad. Annual Report for 1963. 6-7. 
 
14 Daughen, Joseph R., and Binzen, Peter. The Wreck of the Penn Central. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971. 52-53. 
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Young, a man with a history of clinical depression, shot himself at his Florida mansion on 
January 25, 1958.15 This abruptly left his protege, Alfred E. Perlman, in charge of the troubled 
New York Central. 
 Perlman was an oddity in the railroad industry. First, he held degrees from MIT and 
Harvard. Second, he was considered an intellectual and theoretician within the railroad 
community. While pursuing his master’s degree in railroad administration at Harvard, he wrote 
several well-regarded papers on railroad reorganization and consolidation, becoming a true 
believer in both. Third, he was Jewish. Railroading, a rather conservative if not reactionary 
business had always been dominated by Protestant men. No Jew had ever headed a Class I 
railroad.16 Perlman had risen to high regard in the industry by rescuing and modernizing the 
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad (D&RGW). In 18 years of work at that railroad, he had 
worked his way up through the engineering department to being its executive vice president by 
1952.  In this position, he undertook innovative measures to modernize the railroad and cut costs. 
He emphasized replacement of outdated equipment, with the D&RGW becoming an early 
adopter of dieselization. As the D&RGW was a fairly small railroad, with only 2,500 miles of 
track, Perlman was able to personally supervise operations, to his great delight. Perlman’s style 
worked very well on the D&RGW.17 Young was impressed by this and thought Perlman was just 
the man that the ailing New York Central needed.  
 The first round of merger talks eventually fizzled out. Pennsylvania president Symes and 
 
15 Ibid. 53-54. 
 
16 Sobel, Robert. The Fallen Colossus. New York: Weybright and Talley. 1977. 212-214 
 
17 Salsbury. No Way to Run a Railroad. 80-81. 
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Perlman simply disliked each other. Perlman was rather skeptical of the idea of a Pennsylvania-
New York Central merger at the time, preferring a merger with the Chesapeake & Ohio (C&O) 
and Baltimore & Ohio (B&O).18  However, the C&O takeover of the B&O in May 1960 obviated 
such a merger.19 After a desperate bid to acquire enough B&O stock to block the combination, 
the C&O took over the B&O, leaving the Central largely on its own. As Symes put it, “They 
were out in left field without any sunglasses.” 20 Thus, in October 1961, the Pennsylvania and the 
Central resumed talks.  
 In January 1962, the boards of the two railroads approved the merger, and in May their 
stockholders followed suit. The merger was difficult. The ICC hearings process necessary to 
merge the two railroads dragged on for four years. To complicate matters even further, James 
Symes retired in 1963. His hand-picked successor was Stuart T. Saunders, the third of the 
principal characters in the story.  Plucked from the Norfolk and Western (N&W), Saunders faced 
enormous challenges in carrying out the merger. Dozens of states and cities along the proposed 
Penn Central’s tracks opposed it. The New Haven Railroad, a financial basket case the 
Pennsylvania and the Central wanted nothing to do with, wanted in on the merger as well.21 To 
make matters worse, President John F. Kennedy’s Justice Department announced it was opposed 
to the Pennsylvania - New York Central merger as it simultaneously okayed the Chesapeake & 
 




20 Daughen. The Wreck of the Penn Central. 59.  
 
21 "New Haven Cites Merger Economy: I.C.C. Told of Savings if it Joins Pennsy-Central." New York Times (1923-




Ohio - Baltimore & Ohio combination.22 In addition to strong governmental opposition, the 
unions had to be appeased, local politicians had to be sold on the idea, and the all-powerful ICC 
would still have to approve the merger.  
The Merger Arrives 
Saunders swept away nearly all opposition. The unions were appeased with a generous 
agreement protecting the jobs of all railroad employees and promising to rehire furloughed 
employees. He politicked effectively with state and local governments, promising jobs and 
service would remain unaffected. Finally, on April 27, 1966, the ICC ruled unanimously that the 
merger between the Pennsylvania and the Central could go ahead, on the condition that the 
bankrupt New Haven be included, which would constitute the world’s largest privately owned 
railroad.23 The merger would remain tied up in the court system for anti-trust reasons for most of 
the next two years, but on January 15, 1968, the Supreme Court sided with Penn Central, 
effectively greenlighting the merger over the complaints of the critics, led by Milton Shapp, a 
Pennsylvania Democrat who had sued to stop the merger and later used his campaign against the 
railroad to launch his political career, becoming governor in 1970.24 The Supreme Court 
remanded the various cases back down to district courts, allowing the merger to officially occur 
 
22 Loftus, Joseph A. "Administration Opposes A Central-Pennsy Merger: I.C.C. is Told it would Not be in Public 
Interest'--Joining of C. & O. and B. & O. Backed--Other Combinations Urged CENTRAL MERGER OPPOSED 
BY U.S." New York Times (1923-Current File), Oct 02, 1963.  
http://proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/116687562?accountid=14663. 
 
23 Zimmerman, Fred L. "All of New Haven Operations must be Included; Order Shields 3 Smaller Lines: ICC 
Allows Pennsy, New York Central Roads to Merge; all of New Haven to be Included; Smaller Lines Shielded." 
Wall Street Journal (1923 - Current File), Apr 28, 1966.  
http://proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/133121405?accountid=14663. 
 
24 Fortas, Abe, and Supreme Court Of The United States. U.S. Reports: Penn-Central Merger cases, 389 U.S. 486. 
1967. Periodical. https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep389486/. 
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at 12:01 A.M. on February 1, 1968. Initially, optimism for the newly merged Penn Central was 
high. In a glowing article entitled “Toward the 21st Century Limited”, Time wrote: 
Saunders will be working in tandem with the Central's President Alfred E. Perlman, 65, 
one of the best operating men in the business; and the two men will be managing a 
railroad empire to excite the envy of a Hill or a Harriman. The Penn Central will operate 
on 40,000 miles of track in 14 states and two Canadian provinces. It will run 4,200 
locomotives, 195,000 freight cars, and 4,937 passenger cars. It will also be the nation's 
largest private landlord, with real estate holdings that include Park Avenue hotels and a 
Pittsburgh office building-apartment complex, a 25% share in the new Madison Square 
Garden, erected over the rebuilt Pennsylvania Station in New York City, resorts in 
Florida, parks in Texas and housing developments in California. The diversified 
corporation will have total assets of $6.3 billion, annual revenues of almost $2 billion, 
and tidy tax-loss credits from dismal years in the past that will help to improve net 
income for years to come. Most of all, in its plans and in its performance, Penn Central 
will be a prototype of the U.S. railroad of the future.25 
Instead of being a “prototype of the U.S. railroad of the future,” Penn Central would fail for a 
number of reasons. Its management and employees could not cooperate.  All of its top three men, 
Saunders, Bevan and Perlman, despised each other and could not work together effectively. The 
culture, philosophy and practices of the two railroads were different. The troubles affecting the 
two railroads remained as dire as ever. Both were losing money on rail operations and only 
remained profitable through their diversified holdings. Saunders and Perlman essentially planned 
to merge the two railroads immediately. It was a catastrophe from the start.  
Financial Crisis 
On merger day, the new railroad was very short on cash with only a paltry $13.3 million 
in working cash, considered by Bevan, now Penn Central’s Chief Financial Officer, to be “totally 
 




inadequate”.26 To make matters worse, increasing inflation led to high interest rates, leading to 
banks becoming stingy with loans. With money tight, banks were unwilling to use their limited 
capital on the Penn Central. Thus Bevan and the Penn Central had to go to the ICC to ask for the 
authority to issue commercial paper, otherwise known as an unsecured promissory note, 
essentially a glorified IOU with a specific promise and timeline to pay, in order to raise some 
much needed cash.27 Meanwhile, Perlman had convinced Saunders and the board to make $300 
million in capital expenditures to improve and modernize the railroad’s physical plant, similar to 
what he had done successfully at the D&RGW.28 Considering the railroad had lost about $140 
million because of railroad operations in 1968, Penn Central’s financial problems were getting 
dire.29 Nevertheless, Penn Central’s diversified assets managed to make enough money to allow 
them to pay out dividends on their stock in 1968, thanks to real estate investments and the 
Buckeye Pipeline Company.30  
Red vs. Green 
 As bad as the merged Penn Central’s finances were, its operations were worse. Penn 
Central’s problems started at the top and permeated throughout the company. The Pennsylvania 
and the Central had widely differing operating philosophies. This led to “red team-green team” 
feuding, so called because the Pennsylvania’s boxcars were red and the Central’s were green. 
 
26 Salsbury. No Way to Run a Railroad. 153.  
 
27 Bedingfield, Robert E. "Penn Central Sells Short-Term Issue and Plans Another". New York Times (1923-Current 
File), Aug 07, 1968. http://proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/docview/118280977?accountid=14663. 
 
28 Salsbury. No Way to Run a Railroad. 156.   
 
29 Penn Central Company. Annual Report. 1968. 
 
30 Ibid.  
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The Pennsylvania was fairly decentralized and conservative in its management, with its various 
regions having a great degree of autonomy.  They operated almost as separate railroads. Its 
regional managers were responsible for operations, repairs, budgeting, and capital expenditures. 
One of Bevan’s achievements had been to develop centralized accounting and computing 
systems that allowed top level Pennsylvania management to have accurate and up to date 
information on how the various regions of their vast network were operating, enabling them to 
better manage the railroad as a whole.31 In addition, a large portion of the Pennsylvania’s 
business came from hauling ore and coal, volume goods, over the Appalachians.32 
 In contrast, the New York Central was highly centralized and more radical and 
innovative. This was evidenced by its hiring of Perlman, best known for revitalizing the 
struggling D&RGW. To quote Perlman: “After you’ve done a thing the same way for two years, 
look it over carefully. After five years, look at it with suspicion. And after ten years, throw it 
away and start all over.”33 This would have been heresy at the Pennsylvania. Whereas the 
Pennsylvania’s bread and butter was moving volume over the mountains, the Central’s was 
making a profit by delivering manufactured goods along its famously quick Water Level Route 
between New York City and Chicago.34 Put simply, the Pennsylvania was a volume driven 
railroad. Their rate structure was designed to encourage the movement of the largest volume of 
goods possible — low rates for minimum service. The Central was only interested in traffic that 
made money and was willing to work closely with shippers to meet their exact needs. This led to 
 
31 Salsbury. No Way to Run a Railroad. 118.    
 
32 Daughen. The Wreck of the Penn Central. 90.   
 
33 Daughen. The Wreck of the Penn Central. 90-91.    
 
34 Ibid.  
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the Central adopting and developing such innovative techniques as loading semi trailers on 
flatcars. The Pennsylvania represented the old school of railroading and the Central represented 
the new school.35 
 Saunders, Perlman and Bevan simply did not work well together. At the Pennsylvania, 
the operating department and Bevan’s financial department regularly bickered and resented each 
other. The operating people blamed Bevan’s financial reforms for the lack of money available 
for improving the railroad’s tracks, yards and locomotives.36 Bevan had never been in favor of 
the merger, putting him at odds with Saunders, whose sole goal at the Pennsylvania had been to 
make the merger a reality. Despite this, Bevan attempted to prepare for the merger, but his 
efforts to convince Saunders to get the Pennsylvania to cooperate more with the Central on 
operations planning in the mid-1960s went nowhere.37 And then there was Perlman, who simply 
just had nothing in common with Saunders. Their backgrounds were rather different, with 
Saunders heading up successful railroads and Perlman salvaging struggling ones. In terms of 
personality, Saunders was an outgoing and well liked social type who quickly integrated himself 
into Philadelphia’s high society. By contrast, Perlman, as a Jewish man, was effectively shut out 
of the high society Saunders so enjoyed and was known to be temperamental with a cutting and 
sarcastic wit.38 Perlman never moved to Philadelphia, where the railroad he was now president of 
was headquartered. Furthermore, the merger had essentially been thrust upon Perlman when the 
Central’s other merger options were exhausted. With the railroad’s president, CEO and CFO all 
 
35 Saunders, Richard. The Railroad Mergers and the Coming of Conrail. Westport: Greenwood Press. 1978. 280. 
 
36 Salsbury. No Way to Run a Railroad. 120.     
 
37 Salsbury. No Way to Run a Railroad. 120-121.      
 
38 Daughen. The Wreck of the Penn Central. 96-100.  
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pitted against each other and unable to work together, problems were inevitable. 
Going off the Rails (Literally) 
 All of this may have been overcome if the operational differences between the two 
railroads had been sorted out. A merger operations plan had been drawn up in the autumn of 
1967, then seemingly tossed aside and never implemented or replaced with any different plan. 
Thus, when the two railroads merged on February 1, 1968, there was no plan, and two very 
different railroads were just mashed together. The two railroads faced issues with their computer 
systems. The Central’s computer system was not fully implemented by merger day, and the new 
Penn Central quickly found that the Pennsylvania’s computers could not talk to the Central’s. 
With the Central’s computer system unable to provide accurate and detailed information, 
operations and financial planners from the Pennsylvania, accustomed to Bevan’s accurate 
computer system, did not know what to do and made mistakes.39  
 The new Penn Central’s rail yards were a disaster. The brand new Selkirk Yard, near 
Albany, intended to be a focal point of the railroad, exchanging traffic from the Great Lakes and 
Midwest with traffic from New York and New England, was a prime example of this 
dysfunction. It opened ahead of schedule in July 1968 with 20 of its 90 tracks not yet completed. 
The results were predictably disastrous with train cars getting lost in the yard for up to 27 days.40 
Other yards were no better, with St. Louis’ two yards averaging four derailments per day and 
yards in Buffalo and Toledo becoming hopelessly congested. Perhaps the most dysfunctional of 
the yards was the Big Four Yard in Indianapolis. Big Four was intended to be the main hub of 
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the western part of Penn Central’s network, classifying freights from all four cardinal directions. 
Freights backed up onto the mainlines leading into Big Four for miles and miles. Chaos reigned 
at Big Four, crews had seemingly no idea which trains would show up and where they needed to 
go or how to get them there.41  
 Predictably, Penn Central’s dysfunction led to shippers becoming dissatisfied and turning 
to other alternatives to ship their product. This exacerbated the Penn Central’s money problems. 
As income declined, they could not pay to improve service, and as service worsened, they lost 
more money. Penn Central had entered a death spiral. The difficulties between the red team and 
the green team led to a communications breakdown. Ironically, this all happened at the same 
time as Perlman’s $300 million infrastructure improvement plan. Things came to a head in June 
of 1969. Bevan decided he had done all he could do and told Saunders he intended to resign. 
However, under pressure from Saunders, Bevan remained until his mandatory retirement in 
1971.42 Although Saunders did not particularly like Bevan, he did not want to get rid of him. In 
contrast, by mid-1969, he was ready to get rid of Perlman. Early in 1969, Perlman had run David 
Smucker, known to his subordinates as “Mother Smucker”, an old school PRR traditionalist and 
a hated enemy, out of his job as executive vice president.43 This was the last straw for Saunders, 
who sacked Perlman and selected Paul Gorman of Western Electric, the telephone manufacturing 
arm of AT&T, at the time America’s telephone monopoly.44 Perlman was reduced to Penn 
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Central’s vice chairman, essentially removing him from railroad operations.45 At this point, 
Saunders was rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. The Penn Central was bleeding money 
and destined for bankruptcy. It was no longer a question of if it would fail, but when. 
The Penn Central Bankruptcy 
 Penn Central did fail. On June 22, 1970, the news was the largest headline on the front 
page of The New York Times.46 Penn Central had gone bankrupt. Two days before, the Nixon 
administration had shockingly, at least to Penn Central’s management, refused to guarantee a 
$200 million loan to save the struggling railroad.47 A large amount of Bevan’s commercial paper 
had come due, and Penn Central did not have the money to pay it back. Bankruptcy was the only 
option. This was preceded by another shakeup at the top of Penn Central. On June 9, 1970, Stuart 
Saunders himself resigned as chairman and CEO of Penn Central. Also out was David Bevan, 
who “retired as an officer.”  Finally, Perlman was “relieved” of his duties as vice chairman.48 
The three men who had created Penn Central were gone. Now Paul Gorman would serve as 
chairman, president and CEO. 
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events it took a combination of events, people and trends to doom the massive company. Penn 
Central ultimately failed to somehow slow down or stop the larger trends facing the railroad 
industry at the time. In hindsight, this was not all that surprising.  One company, even one the 
size of Penn Central, could not reverse, slow, or otherwise effectively resist huge market trends 
affecting the entire transportation sector of the economy. What makes Penn Central impressive is 
how it seemingly accelerated the downward trends facing the railroad industry at the time. 
Mergers are meant to increase efficiency. The Penn Central merger absolutely destroyed the 
efficiency of the Pennsylvania and New York Central. While both were past their glory days, 
their parent companies were profitable before the merger and they managed to move freight from 
point A to point B in a timely and organized fashion.  
 Penn Central’s epic dysfunction stemmed from its leadership. It would be very difficult to 
find three more incompatible men then Stuart Saunders, Alfred Perlman and David Bevan. The 
leadup to the merger, a process that both railroads spent the better part of the 1960s pursuing, 
was incompetently managed. The trackage of the two railroads duplicated each other more than 
they complemented each other, a vestige of the Gilded Age when the two companies were arch-
rivals on the cutting edge of the railroad industry. The two companies always hated each other 
and competed fiercely; the merger would be akin to something like General Motors announcing 
it would merge with Ford. The “Standard Railroad of the World” and the “Road to the Future” 
could not have been more different culturally.49 The merger was an ill-conceived idea from the 
start. Perlman and Bevan both realized this, nearly from the beginning. Perlman would not have 
desperately tried to pair the Central up with the C&O and B&O if he had not thought Symes’ 
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idea to merge the PRR and NYC was foolish. However, Perlman did not want the Central to be 
left behind in the merger-mania of the 1960s and decided to go along with Symes’ plan, in spite 
of his instincts. It is no surprise that chaos reigned at every level of Penn Central. They 
seemingly tried to just merge two highly opposed railroads on the fly, all while being forced to 
take over the hopeless New Haven by the ICC. Merger had been proposed as a solution to 
problems that were ultimately beyond the control of any individual railroad, no matter how large. 
The whole freight rail business was in decline and regulated in a wholly outdated fashion. 
Passenger trains were wholly unprofitable. If trends were allowed to continue, other railroads 
would inevitably follow the Penn Central into bankruptcy. Something radical had to be done.  
   
The Government Responds 
 Almost immediately, Congress surprisingly sprung into action. The House Commerce 
Committee, chaired by Harley O. Staggers, a West Virginia Democrat, agreed to open hearings 
on the Nixon Administration’s proposed $750 million in loans to the Penn Central and other 
struggling railroads. The Senate Commerce Committee did the same.50 Simultaneously, an 
investigation would be conducted into the failure of the Penn Central and other railroads. 
Interestingly, the Transport Workers Union called for the federal government to nationalize not 
just Penn Central, but the entire nation’s railroad system.51 As Penn Central began to organize 
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under Section 77 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, Judge John P. Fullam of the Federal District 
Court in Philadelphia was selected to handle Penn Central’s bankruptcy.52 On the same day, in 
Cleveland, neither the Central National Bank, the Cleveland Trust Company, or the railroad’s 
own credit union would honor the paychecks of Penn Central employees.53 The situation was 
grim.  
Fullam appointed Jervis Langdon, Willard Wertz, George Baker and Richard Bond as 
trustees to manage the bankruptcy. They were, respectively, the head of the Rock Island Line,54 
the former Secretary of Labor, the former dean of Harvard Business School and the former head 
of Wanamaker’s Department Stores.55 The trustees moved quickly and tapped William H. 
Moore, the Southern Railway’s operations man, to lead the Penn Central. The Southern was 
regarded as one of the better performing railroads at the time and Moore was regarded as a 
tough, old school executive.56 Moore spent two months touring the Penn Central system, telling 
employees “We’re broke, and we need your help making this railroad run.” He streamlined the 
management bureaucracy at the top of the railroad and helped track down $4 million that had 
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disappeared into a Liechtenstein bank.57 Incredibly, he found 352 boxcars that had seemingly 
disappeared into thin air. A short line railroad in the Midwest, the LaSalle & Bureau County, had 
stolen the boxcars, repainted them, and then leased them back to the Penn Central. The railroad 
was too dysfunctional to notice that it was leasing its own boxcars.58  
Despite Moore’s best efforts, Penn Central continued to struggle. Track deteriorated 
across the system, from the yards to the branch lines to the main lines. As track worsened, trains 
had to run at slower speeds. This reduced the amount of trains Penn Central could run, reducing 
potential revenue even further. Derailments were frequent.59 To add insult to injury, the 
American steel industry began to collapse in the early 1970s. The blast furnaces that smelted iron 
into steel required huge amounts of coal to operate. Coal was big business for Penn Central. As a 
result of this decline, bituminous coal loadings on the Penn Central dropped from 1.3 million 
cars in 1969 to just 547,000 by 1975.60 It was becoming obvious to the government, the 
bankruptcy trustees and private investors that Penn Central was not going to be easily 
reorganized. A radical idea, for America, was beginning to gain traction. The idea was 
nationalization. 
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Next Station: Nationalization? 
 The nationalization, or federal government takeover, of railroads in America was 
unprecedented. While most European nations had nationalized their rail networks in the 20th 
century, the furthest America had ever gone with nationalization was temporarily taking over the 
operations of the railroads during World War I. Ownership remained in private hands.  The 
government simply coordinated operations, allowing the rail network to run as one unified 
efficient unit. In 1970, there were two government controlled railroads in the United States. One 
was the Long Island Rail Road, owned by New York State and discussed earlier, and the Alaska 
Railroad, built by the Department of the Interior across harsh terrain to spur development in the 
49th state.61 Both were obviously special and unusual cases. By late 1970, the federal 
government was cooking up a plan to take over the struggling passenger trains of all the 
railroads, not just the Penn Central. The nation’s railroads would be given the opportunity to give 
up their intercity passenger routes and equipment to a new, quasi-governmental corporation 
dubbed Amtrak, a portmanteau of America and track, and to contribute some funding to get the 
new Amtrak off its feet. Unsurprisingly, the railroads were happy to unload their passenger trains 
on Amtrak. Only a handful of railroads declined to give up their passenger operations. On May 
1, 1971, Amtrak came into existence. The government had nationalized nearly every intercity 
passenger train in the nation.62 Although Amtrak has never turned a profit, it has stuck around all 
the way to the present day and remains an important means of transportation, both in the high 
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density Northeast Corridor between Boston and Washington and in many small towns across 
America.  
 Although relieved of its burden of operating intercity passenger trains, the Penn Central 
still retained many commuter operations centered around the major cities it served. Although 
highly unprofitable, they were too highly utilized to be abandoned. To solve this problem, states 
began to subsidize them. State governments made payments to Penn Central and other railroads, 
such as the Reading and Boston and Maine, to support commuter service. Others, such as 
Pennsylvania, New York and New Jersey, even went so far as to purchase new locomotives and 
cars for the Penn Central to use on commuter services.63  
 Although the push for nationalization was starting to gather steam, it still faced several 
major hurdles. First, President Nixon opposed it. A Republican, Nixon hated the idea of the 
government running a major business. But with the 1972 election approaching, he did not want 
to commit to either just letting the Penn Central fail, which would surely cause thousands of lost 
jobs, or nationalization, which would be horrendously expensive and burden the government 
with an unprofitable and seemingly hopeless asset.64 With nationalization seemingly off the table 
for 1971, Penn Central’s trustees started to draw up their plan to restore Penn Central to 
profitability under private ownership. To make Penn Central profitable, the trustees would have 
to cut the only two things they could cut. Thousands of employees would have to be laid off and 
 





$150 million in labor costs would have to trimmed, and nine thousands of miles of track would 
have to be abandoned to shrink the Penn Central to a profitable size.65  
The Darkest Hour 
In a June 25, 1972 interview with The New York Times’ Robert E. Bedingfield, Penn 
Central Trustee Jervis Langdon painted a grim picture of the state of the railroad. Among the 
darkest of his responses was this: 
I think the real problem facing the Penn Central is that the railroad form of transportation 
in the northeastern part of the country may not be viable. In other words, no matter how 
efficiently operated or well managed [they are], the Penn Central and in fact, the other 
railroads in the Northeast may not be able to produce earning power. The only two 
carriers in the territory that are making any money are bituminous coal carriers 
principally, handling this ideal railroad traffic under the most favorable possible 
operating conditions.66 
In response to what they viewed as the totally dire state of the Penn Central in particular and 
northeastern railroading in general, Langdon told Bedingfield that the trustees had seriously 
discussed a plan where the government would take over ownership of the tracks and the private 
railroads would just operate trains over them.67 The trustees were still loath to endorse full 
nationalization, fearing it would preserve all of Penn Central’s troubles, but leaving the federal 
government to foot the bill. Symbolically, the viability of private enterprise was at stake.68 
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 In a desperate attempt to cut costs, in January 1973 Penn Central started dispatching its 
trains with two man crews instead of three man crews and prepared to lay off 5,600 conductors 
and brakemen in direct violation of union contracts. This predictably sent the Penn Central’s 
unionized workers into a rage.  In February, after a 30 day cooling off period, all 88,000 of Penn 
Central’s employees walked off the job. The United Transit Union intended that the strike would 
force the government to intervene. The strategy worked and Congress quickly passed legislation 
that stopped the strike for 90 days. More importantly, it ordered the Nixon administration to 
come up with a solution to the Penn Central quagmire in 45 days.69  
 Penn Central could not continue under private ownership. This left two options: 
liquidation or nationalization. Nobody knew what liquidation would bring for the Penn Central. 
How would it be broken up? Who would get what? How would the millions who relied on it 
continue to get to work and ship their products? On the other side of the issue, Americans 
regarded nationalization as socialistic, not exactly a popular proposition during the Cold War. 
Despite its unpopularity, some Democrats were beginning to realize that it was probably 
inevitable. A staff study for Senator Warren Magnuson’s (D-WA), Commerce Committee 
recommended nationalization after concluding that the status quo was failing to provide 
acceptable rail service.70 For Republicans, nationalization was socialism, and socialism in all 
forms was bad, but they seemingly had no choice.  In March 1973, Judge Fullam ordered the 
trustees to present him a workable plan for reorganization by July, or failing that, a plan for Penn 
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Central’s liquidation.71 Although Langdon proposed a plan for a national railroad monopoly, 
similar to telecommunications monopoly A.T.&T., taking over all of the country’s railroads was 
not popular or politically possible.72 The conflict now engulfed the executive branch, as the 
Department of Transportation (DOT), operating in typical Nixonian style with no regard for 
transparency or due process, did battle with the independent ICC, an agency that moved at a 
glacial pace as it tried its best to guarantee due process in the face of Nixon’s autocratic 
tendencies.  Under the DOT plan, a private corporation would run the remaining viable pieces of 
the northeastern rail network. Meanwhile, the ICC called for a one percent tax on all common 
carrier freight transportation. Revenue raised from this tax would go towards subsidizing 
bankrupt northeastern railroads to the tune of a whopping $600 million annually.73 On June 29, 
the trustees made their decision. Penn Central would be liquidated. All operations would end on 
October 31st of that year. The only way to prevent this, the trustees said, would be $600 million 
to $800 million in aid that would need to be received by October 1.74 The Penn Central’s trustees 
had thrown all their cards on the table. This was the darkest hour. 
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 The government was left with several competing plans to deal with Penn Central. First 
was the Nixon DOT plan to prune all the unprofitable pieces off Penn Central, leaving a skeleton 
railroad that could hopefully survive as a private business. To accomplish this, the proposed new 
business would be exempt from antitrust law, labor law, bankruptcy law, state regulations, 
Congressional oversight, etc. This was a non-starter that few outside of the Nixon White House 
thought was a good idea.75 There was the ICC plan. There was also Senator Vance Hartke (D-
IN), who as chairman of the Senate Transportation Subcommittee, became the public face of the 
congressional response to the Penn Central crisis. He proposed taking the ICC’s tax and using it 
to buy and rehabilitate Penn Central’s track. It would then be leased by a government corporation 
to be known as Consolidated Facilities (ConFac) to railroads for a usage fee.76 Of course, there 
was always the very real threat of liquidation or outright nationalization. 
The 3R Act 
Over at the Union Pacific, president Frank Barnett realized that his company, which 
earned a quarter of its business transferring freight to and from the Penn Central as it made its 
way across the country, could not afford to see Penn Central liquidated. Nor did he want to see 
Penn Central’s assets auctioned off to the highest bidder, which could greatly help Union 
Pacific’s rivals. Barnett’s plan would become the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, 
better known as the 3R Act.77 It was formally introduced to the House of Represenatives on June 
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29, 1973 by Montana Republican Dick Shoup. After losing his seat to Max Baucus in 1974, 
Shoup became a lobbyist for the Union Pacific Railroad. 
 The act provided for the establishment of a corporation to be called the Consolidated Rail 
Corporation, Conrail, to take over the Penn Central and six other bankrupt railroads in the 
Northeast and Midwest. These included the Ann Arbor Railroad, the Erie Lackawanna Railway, 
the Lehigh Valley Railroad, the Reading Railroad, the Central Railroad of New Jersey and the 
Lehigh & Hudson River Railroad. Importantly, the status of Conrail was defined as such:  
The Corporation shall be a for-profit corporation established under the laws of a State and 
shall not be an agency or instrumentality of the Federal Government. The Corporation 
shall be deemed a rail carrier subject to part A of subtitle IV of title 49, shall be subject to 
the provisions of this Act and, to the extent not inconsistent with such Act and subtitle IV 
of title 49, shall be subject to applicable State law. The principal office of the Corporation 
or of its principal railroad operating subsidiary shall be located in Philadelphia in the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.78 
The new Conrail would be structured like a normal for-profit business, except that the vast 
majority of its stock would be held by the federal government. To carry this vision out, the 3R 
Act ordered the creation of the United States Railway Association (USRA), a government owned 
corporation that would oversee the formation of Conrail. The USRA would be headed by a board 
of five directors, a Chairman who was required to not have a financial relationship with any 
freight railroad, the Secretary of Transportation, the Comptroller General, the ICC Chairman and 
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the Chairman of the Board of Conrail.79 The 3R Act also guaranteed loans to keep the bankrupt 
railroads afloat until Conrail could get up and running. The bill was essentially written by the 
Union Pacific’s lawyers, meaning that it passed through Congress fairly quickly and without 
much opposition. It offered a solution that the railroad industry could be happy with, would 
prevent liquidation, and hopefully spur the government to deregulate the industry. Since the 
government would have to subsidize and manage Conrail, the railroad industry hoped it would 
spur deregulation once the government realized what a mess the railroad industry was in at the 
time. This would allow the other railroads to reverse their decline and hopefully avoid further 
Penn Central-esque collapses. Opposition did arise came from free market zealots in the South 
and West, where railroads were still profitable. The bill passed and President Nixon signed it into 
law on January 2, 1974.80 The only substantial change Congress made was to create a new 
agency, the Rail Services Planning Office at the ICC as a check on the Nixon administration. 
Penn Central’s trustees and creditors responded by suing that the 3R Act violated the takings 
clause of the 5th Amendment. The takings clause entitles individuals to “just compensation” if 
private property is taken for public use. The trustees, believing that they were being compensated 
at below market value, sued. However, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 3R 
Act in December 1974 on the grounds that the act was a reorganization act and not an eminent 
domain act.81 
The next step in the process was to have the USRA draw up a preliminary system plan 
for the new Conrail. Under the terms of the 3R Act, the association had 300 days to do this. 
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Congress mandated that the system they drew up be capable of functioning on its own and not 
being a bottomless money pit. They also had to somehow guarantee railroad competition in the 
Northeast.  The C&O/B&O combination, by now known as the Chessie System, and the Norfolk 
& Western, would provide the main competition. The Chessie and the N&W were reluctant to 
participate in this scheme, as they realized that the new Conrail would likely be operating under 
subsidy, putting them at a disadvantage.82 Controversy abounded over branch line abandonments 
(see Figure 3). Penn Central had been insisting that its bankruptcy had been caused its huge 
number of low density, unprofitable branch lines. Now as the USRA, DOT and ICC investigated 
them, the ICC calculated that they only accounted for 7 percent of losses, which were substantial, 
but not as dire as previously thought.83 So where were the other losses coming from? More 
importantly, could Conrail ever hope to be profitable? There was little political will for the 
federal government to subsidize the railroad permanently.  
In the summer of 1974, President Nixon resigned in disgrace. The new Gerald Ford 
administration was starting to hint that they favored “controlled liquidation.” Various pieces of 
the bankrupt railroads would be auctioned off to solvent ones or Amtrak, if Amtrak could cobble 
together enough money.84 This plan, pushed by Transportation Secretary William Coleman, 
foolishly assumed that solvent railroads would actually want to buy Penn Central’s dilapidated 
assets. Neither the Chessie nor the N&W were interested. The N&W’s Jack Fishwick testified 
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before Congress that the N&W had neither the desire nor the resources to buy up parts of Penn 
Central.85 As Congress bickered, the situation on the Penn Central continued to worsen 
throughout 1974. On January 4, William Moore resigned as Penn Central’s CEO and president 
and was replaced by trustee Jervis Langdon.86 The official reasoning given was that the trustees 
felt that Langdon would be better equipped to deal with the transition from Penn Central into 
Conrail.  News later revealed that Moore had foolishly used railroad crews to do some work on 
his house in Potomac, Maryland, a wealthy suburb of Washington, D.C. He had reimbursed the 
railroad, but it was poor optics. The ICC briefly conducted an informal investigation into this 
matter but declined to hold open hearings.87 Penn Central’s physical plant continued to 
deteriorate, prompting the trustees to commission a film, Penn Central 1974, that showed trains 
derailing, trains creeping along decrepit track as their cars frighteningly swayed back and forth 
and featured interviews with demoralized workers and supervisors.88 The film highlighted how a 
vital piece of transportation infrastructure was completely falling apart. 
The Plan 
The USRA finally issued its Preliminary System Plan on February 26, 1975, three 
months behind schedule. The plan called for three competitive systems in the Northeast:  
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Conrail, which would take Penn Central’s place, the Chessie System, and the Norfolk & 
Western. Penn Central would not be broken down into the old Pennsylvania and Central, nor 
would Senator Hartke’s ConFac plan be used. Conrail would be reduced from about 21,000 
miles of track to 15,000. The remaining 6,000 miles would be abandoned or would continue 
under subsidy. The electrified main line from New York to Washington, today’s Northeast 
Corridor, would be reserved for upgraded, high speed Amtrak service.  The plan cost $2.3 billion 
for rehabilitating track and facilities and another $2 billion in federal aid to implement.89  
The USRA finally had a plan. To get to the final plan, it had to figure out what to do with 
the Erie Lackawanna. On January 5, the bankrupt railroad had given up on reorganization and 
decided it would enter Conrail. This meant the preliminary plan would have to be revised in 
order to incorporate the Erie Lackawanna’s assets. It also raised issues of competitive balance, 
with many fearing that incorporating the Erie Lackawanna into Conrail would give Conrail a 
virtual monopoly east of Buffalo.90 To solve this, the Chessie offered to take Erie Lackawanna’s 
lines east of Akron, Ohio. This solved the competition issues present in the preliminary plan. 
When the final system plan was completed in September 1975, the Chessie got the 
aforementioned Erie Lackawanna lines and less importantly, the Southern got Penn Central’s 
agricultural lines on the Delmarva Peninsula, and the Norfolk and Western got the line from New 
Castle, Indiana to Cincinnati, Ohio. More importantly, Amtrak would now own the Northeast 
Corridor between Washington and New York outright.91 Crucially, the USRA valued the 
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properties of the Penn Central at a meager $471 million. Penn Central’s trustees claimed that 
value was closer to $7.4 billion. The trustee’s position was that the physical assets of the railroad 
would have cost billions to construct in 1975 dollars, thus they were worth that much. The 
USRA position was that Penn Central’s physical plant was very dilapidated and would not be 
worth much if it was liquidated, its stock was practically worthless and its bonds incredibly 
depressed.92 The actual value of the Penn Central’s property likely laid somewhere between the 
two figures. If the trustees could convince a court that the USRA was undervaluing Penn Central, 
Conrail would have to pay the Penn Central’s trustees billions to compensate for taking their 
property at reduced value.93 
The 4R Act 
 Next came the implementation of the USRA reorganization. First, more money was 
needed to compensate the trustees, establish the buraeucracy to run Conrail and to repair the 
infrastructure. Second, while the USRA’s plan was a major improvement over previous plans 
and ideas, there was still concern over whether Conrail would ever turn a profit. The Final 
System Plan did not address Conrail’s need to cut its workforce or update its antiquated 
technology. It also did not address railroad rate regulation, which was causing the railroad 
problem to spread into the Midwest, with the Missouri-Kansas-Texas (Katy), the Rock Island, 
Milwaukee Road and North Western all teetering on the brink of failure. Additionally, Amtrak 
needed money to make upgrades to the Northeast Corridor called for by the plan.94 The solution 
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to these problems was Senator Hartke’s Railroad Revitalization and Reform Act of 1976, more 
commonly known as the 4R Act. Congress intended for the act to provide funds for the operation 
of Conrail, give Amtrak money for their Northeast Corridor projects, and secure interim aid to 
other struggling railroads.95 More importantly, the 4R Act began the process of deregulating the 
railroad industry and limiting the power of the ICC. For the six years after passage of the 4R Act, 
the ICC would be required to complete its investigations into merger requests in two years and 
make a final decision in less than 180 days after the conclusion of the investigation.96  
Significantly, the act allowed for the deregulation of freight rates. For seven years, railroads 
would be able to change prices within a seven percent range without ICC approval, as long as 
they had less than 70 percent market share. The ICC was prohibited from making a rate decision 
on the basis of how it would affect other railroads or competing modes of transportation.97  
Day 1: April 1st, 1976 
 President Gerald Ford signed the 4R Act into law on February 5th, 1976. Everything 
looked set for Conrail to take over Penn Central and the other bankrupt lines in April, 1976, 
conveyance day. But at the last minute, on March 22nd, the Chessie-Erie Lackawanna detail fell 
through, rejected by the Erie’s unions, who figured their members jobs would be safer with 
Conrail, which they predicted would be a major government boondoggle where nobody would 
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lose their jobs in order for politicians to keep their constituents happy.98 With the Chessie-Erie 
deal no longer on the table, the issue of the 3R Act’s mandated competition was back again. The 
USRA’s quick solution was to give the Delaware & Hudson substantial trackage rights in New 
York and Pennsylvania.99 Nevertheless, at 12:01 A.M. on April 1st, the Penn Central and the 
other bankrupts ceased to be operational railroads, and Conrail took over. A government 
corporation would now operate the largest railroad in the country, in charge of 100,000 
employees who moved 500,000 commuters and 16,000 carloads of freight every day. The system 
stretched from Boston to St. Louis (see Figure 2) and was both the largest freight and passenger 
railroad in the country thanks to its commuter rail operations.100 The new railroad would be 
headed by the USRA’s Edward Jordan. The USRA claimed that Conrail would turn a profit by 
1979, a claim that made industry experts skeptical.101 
 Conrail’s first year, 1976, went better than expected. The corporation lost only $205 
million, $90 million less than expected. The transition from private ownership was remarkably 
smooth, trains continued to run and much needed repairs and upgrades were being made.102 The 
condition of Conrail’s track began to improve, although it still had a very long way to go, and 
money was invested in rehabilitating or replacing old and unreliable locomotives and rolling 
stock. However, 1977 was a step backward for Conrail, as it lost $367 million, $96 more than 
expected, partially due to a particularly nasty winter, flooding, and strikes all affecting traffic on 
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the railroad.103 Conrail continued to struggle throughout 1978 as the high inflation of the 1970s 
hurt the economy, especially the steel industry. Since Conrail was the major railroad in what was 
then the Steel Belt, steel’s troubles hurt Conrail’s business badly.  Penn Central had left things in 
a pretty sorry state, the trains still had to run if Conrail expected to make money. Each day, 61 
trains were cancelled due to a lack of working locomotives to pull them and more than 19,000 
freight cars were out of service due to various faults.104 As a result, Richard D. Spence, Conrail’s 
president and operations boss, resigned on June 26, 1978. Word on the street was that the USRA 
had forced him out.105 
The Light at the End of the Tunnel 
In the second quarter of 1979, something incredible happened. Conrail turned a profit. 
Dating back to the Penn Central merger in 1968, railroad operations had netted a loss every 
single quarter. Conrail Inside Track, the railroad’s employee news bulletin, published a simple 
headline: “Good News: Conrail nets $29.4 million in second quarter”.106 Included in the article is 
a photo of six very proud looking conrail employees at Greenwich Yard in South Philadelphia. 
Conrail Chairman and CEO Edward G. Jordan put it best when he told reporters at an August 
1979 press conference: “We are no longer trying to find a way to solve the problem. We’re 
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managing the solution.”107 The same edition of Inside Track announced to employees that 
Conrail was hoping that further regulatory reform would provide the system with a route to 
permanent and continuing prosperity. 
  This would come in the form of the Staggers Act, which built on the 4R Act and fully 
deregulated the railroad industry. Railroads would have full freedom to set rates as they saw fit 
for the first time since the 19th century. It would be revolutionary.108  The Staggers Act was what 
Conrail needed to become consistently profitable. In 1981 it turned an annual profit of $69 
million. It was small, but it was permanent. The investments in infrastructure, abandonments of 
unprofitable track (see Figure 3) and early rate deregulation, allowed the railroad to become a 
viable competitor. Deregulation, rather than increasing rates, allowed railroads to lower them to 
better compete with competitors. Rates were set in accordance with market demand, increasing 
business.109 Conrail had gone from the dumpster fire of the Penn Central days to a lean, 
profitable railroad. 1981 was a transformational year for Conrail. In December 1980, Edward 
Jordan stepped down and was replaced by his handpicked successor, the Southern’s L. Stanley 
Crane.110 Crane would work with Congress to pass the Rail Service Improvement Act. The act 
would allow Conrail to lay off employees it deemed redundant, give up all of its passenger 
operations by 1983, and allow it to easily abandon unprofitable lines (see Figure 4 for the state of 
Conrail after these abandonments).111 Under Crane, Conrail would become a successful and great 
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railroad known for efficient, high quality service. Government intervention had worked. Not 
only had Conrail become profitable, but the regulatory reform that accompanied was helping to 
revitalize the entire railroad industry, an idea that had seemed unthinkable just a decade earlier. 
Privatization 
 Once Conrail became consistently profitable, the Reagan Administration, especially 
Transportation Secretary Elizabeth Dole and her deputy James Burnley, sought to privatize it. 
Although the federal government had invested $7 billion in Conrail over the years, money 
Conrail was just finally starting to pay back, this was a matter of neoliberal ideology. The 
Reagan Administration sought to emulate Margaret Thatcher’s privatizations of state owned 
companies such as British Telecom and automaker British Leyland. After rejecting an employee 
buyout plan, because having workers in control was ideologically unacceptable, Dole and 
Burnley settled on selling Conrail for just $1.2 billion to Norfolk Southern, which had been 
formed from a merger of the Norfolk & Western and the Southern.112 Ronald Reagan had said in 
his inaugural address that "Government is not the solution to our problem, government is the 
problem." Conrail was a direct contradiction of this, and Reagan and the Republican Party 
believed that government should not be involved in for profit business. Conrail had to go, even if 
it was going to be sold for far less than the government had spent on it. Selling it to Norfolk 
Southern became official policy.113  
 The Reagan Administration faced two major obstacles, L. Stanley Crane and the 
Democrat-controlled House of Representatives. Crane opposed the sale and was proud of his 
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railroad and firmly believed it should stand on its own as an independent carrier. Additionally, 
the House was opposed to the administration plan both for partisan reasons and over how little 
Norfolk Southern would be paying for Conrail.114 In the end, it was decided to sell the 85 percent 
of Conrail shares that the federal government owned. On March 26, 1987 the stock was offered 
on the New York Stock Exchange at $28 per share. Investors wanted it and by the end of the 
trading day it was worth $30.75 per share.115 Conrail was privatized, ending a story that spanned 
three separate decades, foolish men and brilliant men, billions of dollars, and of course, 
thousands of miles of track and countless locomotives and freight cars.  
Aftermath 
 Conrail went on to be a successful railroad for another decade before being bought out by 
both Norfolk Southern and CSX Transportation. Ironically, this buyout essentially undid the 
Penn Central merger, with Norfolk Southern taking most of the old Pennsylvania lines and CSX 
getting the old New York Central lines. Conrail still technically exists today as a company 
owned by the two railroads to manage sections of the rail network that are shared by the two 
railroads. Conrail’s blue locomotives, once ubiquitous throughout the Northeast, have now faded 
into memory. Conrail’s former commuter trains were taken over by state run agencies in the 
1980s. Most of them are still operational today in the form of railroads like MARC, SEPTA, NJ 
Transit, Metro-North, MBTA and others. Amtrak, created partially out of the Penn Central mess, 
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continues to operate passenger trains. Its Northeast Corridor has become an even more important 
transportation link since the days of Penn Central. 
 Railroad deregulation, a process spurred by the Penn Central crisis, has proven itself to be 
a success. Railroads are consistently profitable and are considered good investments. In 1970, the 
thought of a major investment firm owning a railroad would have been ludicrous. Today, Warren 
Buffet’s Berkshire Hathaway owns the BNSF Railway. Freight rail, helped by deregulation and 
the rise of intermodal container shipping, has rebounded from its nadir in the 1970s to become a 
major means of shipping goods. Shipping rates are much lower. Shippers and railroads have 
largely won from deregulation. Of course, there are losers, namely railroad workers who lost 
their jobs as a result of the mergers and downsizing brought about by deregulation.116 
 As for the legacy of Conrail itself, its nationalization is generally as a success. 
Government intervention saved railroading in the Northeast and across the country. The lessons 
of Penn Central and Conrail resurfaced during the 2008-2009 financial crisis as General Motors 
and Chrysler went bankrupt.117 It serves as a textbook example of successful government 
intervention in the mold of New Deal Keynesian policy. Likewise, its privatization serves as an 
example of neoliberal thought in action in America. Conrail is remembered as a successful use of 
policy and money to create an effective functional railroad that continues to be a vital part of the 
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